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THE LIMITS OF CRIME CONTROL
RICHARD ROSENFELD*
CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME CONTROL (JAMES Q. WILSON & JOAN

PETERSILIA, EDS., OAKLAND, CA: ICS PRESS, 2002). 705 PP.

Crime: Public Policiesfor Crime Control is a superb collection
of essays by a group of distinguished criminologists on what is
known about policies and programs that do and do not appear to
reduce crime and delinquency. Without exception, the authors'

contributions are systematic, careful, timely, and thoughtful. They
also betray a narrowness of vision that has both strengths and
limitations. The most important strength is a resulting emphasis on
public policies to control crime that are politically feasible. The basic
weakness is that by delimiting crime-control policies to just those
that are feasible, we are left with policies that are either unlikely to

make a significant dent in the nation's crime problem, or would do so
at the risk of sharply curtailing individual rights and liberties.
The constricted policy vision evident in this volume is the result
of what the editors regard as "one of the most encouraging
developments of the last four decades ... the increased cooperation

between social scientists and policymakers." '
Whenever parties
cooperate with one another, each gives up something of value in
exchange for something of greater value. It is not immediately clear
what policymakers have given up by cooperating with social
scientists, but it is very evident what social scientists, specifically
criminologists, have exchanged for greater access to and resources
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from policymakers: serious attention to what used to be called the
"root causes" of crime. This volume and the new realism in
criminology that it so ably showcases represent something of a
personal victory for James Q. Wilson, who three decades ago
mounted a forceful case against root-cause explanations of crime as
irrelevant to public policy.2 In the mid-1970's Wilson's argument
was highly controversial. Today it is a taken-for-granted fact of life
in American criminology.
Generally speaking, the "root causes" of crime can be divided
into those embedded in the social order and those embedded in
individuals. Readers searching for explanations or policies linking
crime to the basic social and economic arrangements of American
society will not find any in this book. However, if your preferred
root causes lie in the biological makeup of individuals, you will not
be quite so disappointed.
Adrian Raine's chapter on the biological basis of criminal
behavior takes the reader on a readable and fascinating tour of recent
research on the genetic, psychophysiological, brain-related, and
biochemical sources of anti-social and criminal behavior. The clear
winner in terms of research support, Raine reports, is chronic underarousal. 3 Persons with low resting heart rate are consistently found to
display higher levels of violent and anti-social behavior than
"normals." The reasons appear to be that under-aroused individuals
are less fearful and seek more stimulation than others. Under-arousal
manifested in low resting heart rate is unrelated to any psychiatric
disorder; it is unusual, according to Raine, in its "diagnostic
specificity."4 That is not to say that low resting heart rate is specific
to sociopaths and criminals-far from it. It also characterizes "bomb
disposal experts who have been decorated for their5 bravery" and
"British paratroopers decorated in the Falklands War."
Can explanations of crime as deeply rooted as this one is in the
internal workings of individuals have any meaningful connection to
public policy? Certainly Raine thinks so. The biological bases of
crime, he writes, are "amenable to change through benign
interventions."6 Some of the interventions he discusses, such as
2 Sefe JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).

3 Adrian Raine, The Biological Basis of Crime, in CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME
CONTROL, supra note 1, at 43, 50.

I at 53.
Id.
IJd. at 54.
6 Id. at 71.
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better health care for poor mothers, are benign enough, as are
nutritional enrichment and biofeedback for under-aroused children
and adolescents, although some policymakers may wonder where the
next generation of demolition experts and paratroopers will come
from if such programs actually work. But the larger import of
Raine's policy proposals is less benign. Abnormal individuals may
have little control over the biological conditions that predispose them
to commit violent and criminal acts, he observes, but they are
responsible for knowing their "risk factors" and seeking treatment or
taking other steps to prevent harm to others. If those actions are to be
truly preventative, then they must occur before the harm is done,
presumably at the point of diagnosis. Raine does not describe the
system of medical surveillance and control necessary to detect and
correct the biological risk factors for crime, nor does he describe the
fate of basic legal rights, notably the presumption of innocence, were
such a system implemented at the requisite scale. But, as Wilson
pointed out long ago, proponents of root-cause explanations are
characteristically unconcerned with the costly trade-offs that bedevil
the policymaker.
The other contributors to the volume are mindful of the legal and
political implications of their proposals to reduce crime. They tend to
focus as a result on the more proximate conditions associated with
criminal activity and on actual interventions that have survived more
or less rigorous evaluation. Even the contributors who address earlychildhood and family interventions, the effects of which on serious
delinquent or criminal behavior cannot be known until years later, are
careful to distinguish the programs with the strongest and most
consistent effects from those promising efforts showing mixed or
ambiguous results.
A surprisingly large number of early
interventions do show benefits in the form of reduced childhood
misconduct and later-life criminal behavior. The most effective
interventions include nurse home-visitation programs for "at-risk"
mothers, parent training, bullying prevention, life-skills training in
early adolescence, family therapy, mentoring, and conflict
management. Moreover, some of the programs, although quite
expensive to deliver, are cost effective in terms of forgone or reduced
expenditures on problem youth by schools and juvenile justice
agencies.
As Peter Greenwood points out, the days when criminologists
wrung their hands in frustration over not knowing "what works" with
children, youth, and families are gone. We do know a great deal
about what works, with whom, under what circumstances, and what
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does not work. The same applies to school-based initiatives. In a
thorough and discriminating review of evaluation research on school
programs to prevent delinquency and substance abuse, Gottfredson,
Wilson, and Najaka find consistent evidence for the effectiveness of
cognitive-behavioral
instructional
approaches
(role-playing,
rehearsal, reinforcement) and organizational changes that clarify and
reinforce behavioral norms and expectations. Cullen's assessment of
the rehabilitation literature, the source of Robert Martinson's oftquoted "nothing works" critique of prison programs,7 also concludes
that cognitive-behavioral and social learning techniques are more
effective than other treatment approaches in reducing recidivism.
And what does not work? Peer-group interventions, boot camps, and
instructional programs such as Drug Abuse Resistance Education
(DARE) which do not incorporate cognitive-behavioral devices.
We also seem to know enough to know with some precision
what we still must learn. David Farrington proposes that more
longitudinal investigations are needed to disentangle the causal
mechanisms linking family processes to delinquent and criminal
outcomes. 8 Patrick Tolan suggests that we do not know enough
about how to translate carefully designed and effective family
interventions into broad-based service-delivery systems,9 a concern
echoed by Gottfredson and her colleagues regarding school-based
programs l" and Cullen with respect to the most successful
rehabilitation programs."l Wilson's treatment of this theme in the
conclusion to the volume highlights the key policy issue: How do we
move from small, carefully designed interventions that change the
behavior of individuals to large programs that lower the crime rate?"2
His answer is that we do not know.
During the 1990's, when most of the research summarized in this
volume was conducted, crime rates in the United States fell steadily
7 Robert Martinson, What Works-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 THE
PUB. INT. 22, 49 (1974).
8 David P. Farrington, Families and Crime, in CRIME, PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME
CONTROL, supra note 1, at 129.
9 Patrick Tolan, Crime Prevention: Focus on Youth, in CRIME, PUBLIC POLICIES FOR
CRIME CONTROL, supra note I, at 109.
10 Denise C. Gottfredson et al., The Schools, in CRIME, PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME
CONTROL, supra note 1, at 149.
11 Francis T. Cullen, Rehabilitation and Treatment Programs, in CRIME, PUBLIC POLICIES

I, at 149.
12 James Q. Wilson, Crime and Public Policy, in CRIME, PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME
CONTROL, supra note 1, at 537.
FOR CRIME CONTROL, supra note
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to levels not seen in two or three decades.13 There is no telling what
effect any of the "effective" family, school, or corrections programs
might have had on the crime drop, not simply because they are
limited in scope, but because, with few exceptions, their outcomes
cannot be meaningfully linked to changes in populations. "Behavior"
is a characteristic of an individual. A crime rate is a characteristic of
a population. The interventions discussed thus far are meant to alter
behavior.
A strong individualistic bias runs through criminology, perhaps
owing to the religious roots of the discipline. The late Leslie Wilkins
once asked an audience at a meeting of the American Society of
Criminology to consider how an economist and a criminologist might
try to get Americans, notoriously poor savers, to put more money in
their bank accounts. The economist, Wilkins said, would increase the
savings rate by raising the interest rate. The criminologist would
enroll people in savings rehabilitation programs. The economist
seeks to alter the characteristics of populations by changing the
incentive structure of presumably rational individuals, or enough of
them to matter. The criminologist tries to make individuals rational,
one by one. The present point is not that one approach is more
effective than the other, although Wilkins' preferences should be
clear enough, but rather that the economist's strategy has a
transparent connection to the state or trait of a population, and the
criminologist's strategy does not.
But perhaps it is unfair to fault programs that, after all, are
designed to change individuals for being "individualistic." Several
chapters in the volume consider the consequences for crime control
of changes in situations, communities, regulatory regimes, law
enforcement, and criminal justice practices. However, they do not
come much closer to demonstrating a connection between
interventions and crime rates. Robert Sampson calls for an emphasis
on "places" rather than "people" in community crime prevention
through targeting crime "hot spots," reducing public drinking, erasing
graffiti, cleaning up trash, enforcing zoning codes, rehabbing lowcost housing, building new scattered-site low-income housing, and
maintaining municipal services in poor neighborhoods. 4 In addition
to ameliorating some of the proximate conditions that breed crime,
Sampson argues, these actions both require and would strengthen
3 Richard Rosenfeld, Crime Decline in Context, I CONTEXTS 25, 26 (2002).
14

Robert J. Sampson, The Comnunity, in

supra note 1, at 225.
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neighborhood social organization, which is the fundamental
precondition for maintaining low crime rates over the long term.
Ralph Taylor's discussion of crime prevention through environmental
design draws similar conclusions."5
What impact such activities, in isolation or in combination,
might have on local crime rates is difficult to say. However, even if
they were shown to be highly effective, community-crime prevention
shares with people-based interventions an implementation strategy of
saving one place (one building, one block) at a time. What prevents
more comprehensive implementation of research-based community
programs that work? Sampson anticipates the answer in his comment
that, "given the nature of American society,

'16

much of the

investment in crime prevention will have to come from poor
communities themselves. What precisely is it in the nature of
American society that places the burden of crime prevention on
people with the weakest political and economic capacity to carry it?
Neither Sampson nor the other contributors to this volume will say.
In their review of research on labor markets and crime, Bushway
and Reuter pursue the same non-universalistic policy logic by
excluding from consideration "general macroeconomic policies,"17
over which the poor have little influence, in favor of "community and
individual programs"18 targeting high-risk people and places. They
describe the fundamental labor market transformations over the last
half century that have resulted in high rates of structural
unemployment in poor and minority communities, and then
methodically document the dismal crime-prevention record of
enterprise zones, community-development grants, and "Weed and
Seed" ("weed" the area of drug dealers and other criminals and then
"seed" it with development opportunities). Tellingly, the programs
that do appear to have beneficial effects are those offering poor
families the opportunity to move out of high-crime neighborhoods
into low-crime, non-poor areas.
But such housing-dispersal19
programs are "not likely to be politically feasible on a large scale.'
Evidently, we are stuck with labor-demand programs like enterprise
15 Ralph B. Taylor, Physical Environment, Crime, Fear, and Resident-based Control, in
CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME CONTROL, supra note 1, at 413.

16

Sampson, supra note 14, at 252.

17

Shawn Bushway & Peter Reuter, Labor Markets and Crime, in CRIME: PUBLIC

POLICIES FOR CRIME CONTROL, supra note 1, at 191, 192-93.
I /d. at 193.
Id. at 206.
I9
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zones that do not work and supply-side programs such as the Job
Corps that are somewhat more promising but also expensive, and
therefore limited in scope. In the area of employment, we have pretty
much exhausted existing person- and community-based policy
options to control crime.
For somewhat different reasons, I draw the same conclusion
from Boyum and Kleiman's insightful discussion of drugs and
crime."
Policymakers oppose universalistic strategies of proven
effectiveness, such as methadone maintenance for heroin addicts,
because they seem to condone drug use. Meanwhile, popular but
ineffective community programs such as DARE persist. Any policy
or program that so much as hints at rational self-management or
controlled use is politically verboten. Boyum and Kleiman argue
convincingly that if "drug abuse control policy were made primarily
for practical reasons and primarily with an eye to the control of
predatory crime, the result would probably be a substantial reduction
in crime."21 Their conclusion regarding drug policy also applies to
gun control. Cook, Moore, and Braga write: "Even a definitive
empirical demonstration that a gun control measure would save lives
will not persuade someone who believes in an absolute individual
right to keep and bear arms."2 Such practical considerations are of
secondary importance in the making of crime-control policy in the
United States, and therefore in criminological research with a prayer
of achieving the prized imprimatur: "policy-relevant."
The limits of politically palatable crime-control policy are
illustrated throughout the volume. Economist Steven Levitt, who
does appreciate the centrality of crime rates to a discussion of crime
reduction, speculates in his review of research on deterrence that
deterrence policies likely account for no more than a quarter of
observed variation in crime rates across place and time.
"Nonetheless," he concludes, "to the extent that deterrence is a factor
that can be readily influenced by public policy through changes in the
criminal justice system, it may represent the quickest and most
efficient way for government to influence criminal activity in the
short run."2 3

The criminal justice system is the arena in which the United
20

David A. Boyum & Mark A.R. Kleiman, Substance Abuse Policy from a Crime-

control Perspective, in
21 Id. at 382.
22 Id.at 291
23 Id. at 450.

CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME CONTROL, supra note 1, at

331.
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States does have something akin to universal crime policies. Every
- local community of any size has a police force and a prosecutor, and
every state has a corrections system, which look a lot like the police,
prosecutors, and prisons found elsewhere. Lawrence Sherman has
been as successful as any criminologist in convincing local police
departments to test new methods of patrol deployment and in
transplanting best practices from one jurisdiction to another.24 Alfred
Blumstein25 and Joan Petersilia26 are responsible and savvy critics of
current sentencing and corrections policy. Brian Forst presents a
sound critique of the "one-case-in-a-vacuum" principle of
prosecution." But none of the sensible advice they offer in this
volume is likely to change crime-control policy very much.
Crime-control policy is changing: it is becoming more punitive.
Imprisonment rates have skyrocketed since the 1970's to levels not
seen anywhere else in the world, except South Africa and Russia.
Even when adjusted for arrests or convictions, according to James
Lynch, the U.S. incarceration rate is higher than those in other
developed nations for property and drug offenses.28 Although the
sharp growth in incarceration has begun to level off in recent years,
and some states have begun to register small declines, over two
million Americans now reside in prison or jail.29 Meanwhile, more
than twice that number are under some form of correctional
supervision in the community, where new forms of surveillance,
control, and punishment are emerging with little notice from
researchers or even many policymakers. Petersilia points out that
registration and public notification requirements, originally intended30
for serious sex offenders, have begun to spread to other crime types.
It should not be too long before community residents in some states
are routinely notified of the presence of convicted burglars and
24

Lawrence W. Sherman, Fair and Effective Policing, in CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR

CRIME CONTROL, supra note I, at 383.
25 Alfred Blumstein, Prisons: A Policy Challenge, in CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME

supra note I, at 451.
Joan Petersilia, Community Corrections, in CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME

CONTROL,
26

CONTROL, supra note 1, at 483.
27 Brian Forst, Prosecution, in CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME CONTROL, supra note
1, at 509.
28 James Lynch, Crime in International Perspective, in CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR
CRIME CONTROL, supra note 1, at 5.
29 Allen J. Beck & Paige M. Harrison, Prisoners in 2000, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL.,

Aug. 2001, at 1.
30 Petersilia, supra note 26, at 500.
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robbers in their midst, regardless of whether they have completed
their sentences. Most states now use some form of electronic
monitoring to manage offenders in the community, and some have
begun to use Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) systems to track their
whereabouts twenty-four hours a day. Sophisticated communitycorrections technologies, according to Petersilia, "will accelerate in
the coming years and allow community corrections the option of
becoming more surveillance oriented." 3 '
Were such developments to be accompanied by increased
treatment and rehabilitation services, and greater personal contact
between parole and probation officers and their clients, one might
worry less about their implications for personal rights and liberties.
However, once again political realities prefigure the feasible policy
options. Petersilia sees a ray of hope in a new willingness on the part
of probation and parole agencies to form partnerships with other
criminal justice entities. Nonetheless, she predicts fewer services for
persons supervised in the community and continuing high recidivism
rates, even as the electronic Panopticon widens.32
Ironically, by accepting the limits of feasible crime-control
policy, criminologists have abrogated the chief responsibility of the
social scientist in a democracy: providing the knowledge and
perspective needed for informed debate over public policy. Genuine
debate has to be informed at some level by knowledge of the social
origins of public problems. We need more criminologists able and
willing to say why so many families require "intervention," why so
many students are alienated from their schools, why so few jobs are
available to inner-city residents, why so many young adults are unfit
for the available jobs, why Americans are so likely to use guns to
settle disputes, and why we incarcerate such a large fraction of our
population, even controlling for our high rate of gun violence. An
informed democratic citizenry also needs research scholars able and
willing to say why so many policymakers are indifferent or hostile to
converting small-scale prevention successes into broad-based,
practical crime policies. And the resulting research on the root
causes of crime and crime control should demonstrate the same level
of scientific rigor as the excellent policy-relevant studies in this
volume.

31 id.
32 id.
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